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Abstract
This article challenges what is now the orthodoxy concerning the heritage of Bourdieu
(1930–2002): namely, the judgement that his distinctive sociological innovation has
been his theory of social reproduction, and that he has failed to provide a necessary
theory of social change. Yet Bourdieu consistently claimed to offer a theory of social
transformation as well as accounting for continuities of power. Indeed, he provides two
substantive keys for an understanding of historical transformation—first, a theory of
prophets (religious or secular) as the authors of heresies or “symbolic revolutions” that
dispel current doxa; second, a theory of the “corporatism of the universal”: the role of
intellectuals or other educated professionals in pursuit of social justice and other
universalistic goals. Moreover, Bourdieu fuses his theories of “symbolic revolutions”
with a materialist analysis of their social preconditions, including a fresh account of
social crises. Crises—war, famine, recession, and especially the intensified precarity of
the educated—have, for him, a profound impact, both within differentiated fields and
across fields. Conflicts that become effectively synchronized across fields acquire great
resonance within the wider field of power, particularly due to hysteresis or “maladjust-
ed habitus.” Indeed, the appearance of crises, together with new prophetic heresies,
leads the subordinate classes to question the taken-for-granted order of things and to
orchestrate their resistance. Alongside his corpus of published writings, this article
draws widely on Bourdieu’s posthumously published lectures. These cast a distinctive
new light on how his well-known conceptual instruments can aid us in the study of
historical change. They also expand on how social science itself might be used to
facilitate progressive social movements.
Keywords Elite reproduction . Heterodoxy. Intellectuals . Prophets . Revolutions . Social
transformation
Theory and Society
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-019-09375-z
I should like to express my gratitude to Matt Dawson and Andrew Smith of Glasgow University, Roy Enfield
and the anonymous peer reviewers and Editors of Theory and Society for helpful advice in revising this article.
* Bridget Fowler
Bridget.Fowler@glasgow.ac.uk
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
In 2001, Pierre Bourdieu attended a colloquium at Cerisy-la-Salle in his honour, to
which I was invited. With the memorable exception of Tassadit Yacine, the conference
gathered together only his “foreign researchers.” This was due to Bourdieu’s embattled
status within France, as indicated by the savage criticism of Verdès-Leroux (1998),
Heinich (2007), and Latour (2007). These bitter Parisian culture wars continue to rage:
see, for example, Jean-Louis Fabiani’s erudite but profoundly disenchanted study,
Pierre Bourdieu: Un structuralisme heroïque (2016) and the important rebuttal in
Joly’s Pour Bourdieu (2018).
As is well-known, Bourdieu extended the relational concept of economic capital
found in Marx to cultural, social and symbolic capitals. He thus provides a valuable
insight into the resources available for dominant actors in late capitalism. In particular,
he has updated Weber so as to show the roles of education in modernity, not least the
symbolic intimidation of the subordinate classes by the dominant class who possess
legitimate cultural capital. Such educational accreditation operates with the logic of a
status group, yet, as Swartz illuminatingly remarks: “[…] Bourdieu develops a general
argument to show that status functions to disguise class interests” (Swartz 1998, p. 150,
also p. 184).
The symbolic profits of cultural capital are typically converted into economic
capital, not least, the mega-salaries of corporate employers. By World War II, certified
cultural capital1 had become a prerequisite for many higher professional, bureaucratic,
and corporate jobs, although in many fields, additional social capital (influential
patrons) might also be required (Bourdieu 1996b, p. 142). Bourdieu and his colleagues
refer to this as the “new mode of reproduction” within the dominant class, showing the
decline of direct economic inheritance and its mediation instead via cultural capital
(Bourdieu and Boltanski 1978, pp. 220–221). In general, only those from the dominant
class possess the “primary pedagogy” and hence the habitus to benefit appreciably from
the secondary pedagogies in school (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 479, 571; Bourdieu 1996b;
Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, pp. 31–51). Yet given that the educational system is
deployed “neutrally” to reproduce not just the educators but also the occupants of the
most powerful jobs elsewhere, the subordinate classes typically “misrecognise” their
failure as due to their individual weaknesses (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, pp. 204–
205). The educational system in this “logic of practice” thus constitutes a new
legitimatory “sociodicy,” as profoundly effective as those “theodicies” described by
Weber, namely the Indian Hindu karma system and the salvation promise for deserving
Christians (1990, p. 208).
Several theorists have taken issue with Bourdieu’s theoretical analysis of the logic of
practice, developed here and elsewhere (most notably, 1990a). Fabiani (2016, p. 83)
and Michael Burawoy, for example, claim—mistakenly, in my view—that Bourdieu’s
distinctive concept of habitus is merely a rhetorical “black box,” “unverifiable and
unknowable,” a mystifying disguise cloaking workers and peasants’ allegedly fatalistic
1 I share Lareau and Weininger’s contention (2003) that the “dominant interpretation” linking cultural capital
to knowledge of “highbrow” cultural pursuits is too restrictive. Rather, as Bourdieu suggests, such capital
entails “competences” such as reading at home, or classificatory skills that enable the appropriation of a given
societal heritage. Crucially these relate to “the educational norms of the classes capable of imposing the …
criteria of evaluation which are the most favourable for their children” (Lareau and Weininger 2003, p. 588).
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adjustment to the world (Burawoy 2012, p. 204, Burawoy and Holdt 2012). He is
criticized widely for insufficient rigour in showing precisely how the habitus offers a
non-reductive account of actors’ dispositions, given that differing trajectories and
improvised practices are sieved first through the “historical unconscious” of family
and class experiences (Bourdieu 1990a, pp. 56, 60). Further, Alex Callinicos, like Craig
Calhoun, argues that Bourdieu’s sociology has a “relatively weak conception of
systemic contradiction” (Callinicos 2006, p. 82; Calhoun 1995, p. 141), whilst for
Scott and Wacquant (1987) it is lacking in any resources to conceptualize peasant or
working-class resistance in the face of oppression (Scott 1987, pp. 323–325). Even
David Swartz, who is favourably disposed, concludes his initial, highly perceptive,
book by regretting Bourdieu’s failure to “assemble […] a general theory of social
change” (1998, p. 217):
Bourdieu’s understanding of the dynamics of social life in advanced societies is
one of structural permutations rather than of structural transformation; one of
market competition, not collective organisation; and one of reproduction, not
revolution (1998, p. 188)
Against the grain of such criticisms, I would endorse Swartz’s recent claim that
Bourdieu does have a theory that is “conceptually open to elements of change”
(2013, p. 244). Indeed, from his studies of the Algerian “cauldron” onwards, Bourdieu
was concerned with two particular transformations: first, the transition from a closed
peasant world to capitalist modernity, dominated by an “economy for its own sake” and
secondly, the transition to an urban, industrialised society in which a stable working-
class typically develops collective, future-oriented action (2008a [1962], pp. 120–121).
Of course, a great merit of his theory is its unrivalled account of the dominants’
capacities in France to perpetuate their advantages over time, especially by the skilful
adaptation of capitals from one type to another.2 On that score, he has been sensitive,
for example, to the conflict of generations within certain social fields, which, paradox-
ically, may serve only to conserve the general hierarchies and material inequalities.
Nevertheless, I propose that Bourdieu’s sociology does allow for emancipatory
action, by addressing actors’ encounters with heterodox discourses, as well as by
specifying their conditions of possibility.3 His sociology has consistently possessed a
rich subtext that offers theoretical resources for analysing actors’ critique, resort to
heterodox beliefs and engagement in transformative societal change, both at field and
2 However, note that Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) also distinguish historically among different modes of
reproduction: the privately-educated feudal aristocracy, the Jesuit colleges of the seventeenth century gentle-
man (honnête homme), and the lycées and grandes écoles of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie.
3 I agree with Swartz’s earlier view when he distinguishes the elements that constitute a Bourdieusian analysis
of social change, amongst them the “intrusion of external events into fields,” “uneven development and
conjuncture of crises amongst different fields,” and “social struggles that expose field doxa…” (1998, p. 217).
But Swartz also argues that “these have yet to be assembled into a general theory […]” (1998, p. 217),
agreeing with Wacquant that: “these [variables] never assume more than the status of isolated negative
specifications (how reproduction breaks down) rather than the elements of a systematic model of structural
change (how transformation occurs)” (Wacquant 1987, p. 81). Swartz’s later book (2013) significantly
modifies this position. Nevertheless, it seems to me that he—along with Burawoy, Scott, and Wacquant—
consistently underestimate the value of Bourdieu’s theory of change.
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societal levels (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1990, pp.102,109, 132–7). In Gorski’s graphic
words (2013, p. 2): “the concern with historical change is a red thread, sometimes
thicker, sometimes thinner, that traverses his entire life’s work.” I seek to demonstrate
this, with particular reference to his recently-published Collège de France lectures:
Manet: une révolution symbolique (2013), On the State (2014), and Sociologie
générale Vol. I (2015) and Vol. II (2016).4
For the late Bourdieu—hostile to “chic relativism” (2000a, p. 71)—transformation is
linked to invitations to “reflexivity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In this respect,
Bourdieu might be seen as the last of a long line of philosophers who advocate
deliberation to understand how they should act in the world. Yet for him, as for
Gouldner (1971, pp. 488–512), such reflexivity needs to be guided by empirically-
grounded social science (1984, p. 94). This alone can combine a methodology for
revealing the historical genesis and character of the structures determining practice
(“objectivation”) together with explorations of the subjective “perspectives,” “eye,” or
meanings shaped by actors’ positions within various fields. Importantly, against Cal-
houn and Callinicos, Bourdieu’s sociological approach elucidates the inner contradic-
tionswithin such fields, including the encompassing meta-field of class power (1978, p.
168). He had noted by the early1980s, for example, that fields are bisected by resistance
to the symbolic power of the more consecrated dominants within them (1987b; 1991a;
1993; 2015, pp. 540–545).
His account of crises ramifying through an entire society and initiating historical
transformation starts from Weberian studies, especially linked to those crises that
heighten pre-existing conflicts between prophets and priests (Weber 1978, pp. 439–
457). Such an analysis emerged first in the context of Bourdieu’s ethnography of the
Algerian War. His research for this emphasized the land seizures—ratified in the
colonial laws of 1871–1873—accompanying the imposition on Algerians of both
French capitalism and the European dominant “caste” (2008a, pp. 126, 126–150), an
abrupt shift from a “mechanical” to an “organic” division of labour. But if, for the
traditional pre-capitalist Algerian peasantry, this was the “end of a world,” it was also
accompanied by the gathering movement of Algerian rebellion, interpreted and led by
secular “prophets.” In this case, they were Kabylian oral poets5 and writers: prominent
amongst them: Mouloud Feraoun (1962), Malek Ouary and Mouloud Mammeri
(2008a, pp. 125–137; Bourdieu and Mammeri, in Bourdieu 2008a).
Crucially, in his chapter on the French May 1968 “events” in Homo Academicus
[1988], Bourdieu gives us a general analysis of revolution, although a revolution
effectively repressed. He shows that the initial conflict was most explosive within the
expanding but relatively autonomous university field, due to new staff with a different
habitus and lower qualifications, the devaluation of degrees and the growth of the social
sciences (2015, pp. 477–479). The original site of revolutionary collision was then
4 The initial lectures of Sociologie Générale I, from April–June 1982, have now been translated into English
as Classification Struggles (2019).
5 “And we in Algeria are present at this end of a world,” he remarks, observing that “A society so thoroughly
turned upside down will force the invention of revolutionary solutions and mobilise these masses […] by
offering them a new art of living” (2008b [1961], pp. 12–13) [translation altered in light of 2000a, pp. 136–
137: translations from French are by me.] See also his allusions to a “rational revolutionary consciousness”
and a “politics of revolutionary rationalisation” (2008a, pp. 120–121) with reference to a settled and embedded
urban working-class, capable of thinking about the future.
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amplified and extended: in this case, to that of industrial production (Sud-Aviation
Bouguenais, Renault-Billancourt and elsewhere). As different fields became drawn into
the conflict, the taken-for-granted nature of everyday life and the anticipated future
became suspended, replaced by an extraordinary experience of “public time”: a “vague
and almost empty time, common to the different fields” (1988, p. 185).6 Resentments,
triggered by disappointed expectations at the Sorbonne and elsewhere, began to
coalesce, alongside deep-rooted industrial and media conflicts (1988, pp. 170, 174–
180).
The 1968 academic crisis was marked by disputes over lecturing, teaching, and the
traditional (ten-year) doctorat d’Etat. But it was also accompanied by much wider
transformations in the presentations of self in everyday life, such as students’ use of
“tu” (rather than “vous”) to professors (1988, pp. 186–188). Bourdieu borrows unex-
pectedly from Augustin Cournot’s model (1861) to frame the structural homologies
between different fields and to chart their mounting “synchronization” (1988, p. 174).
As Sapiro helpfully notes, Bourdieu shows that many fields were affected by the new
post-war demographic patterns and more market-oriented modes of production,
resulting in field-specific evolution or revolution, in education as well as changes
elsewhere. The effect of such crises is to bind fields together. Put succinctly, the
historical “event” or turning-point—whether it is the Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906), the
National Revolution (1940) or the May '68 Events—results from the “synchronization
of the different fields’ temporality and the harmonization of their agenda […] during
the crisis” (Sapiro 2013, p. 266).
This is strikingly clear in Bourdieu’s analysis of the Dreyfus Affair, where a crisis
provoked by the mistrial for espionage and the wrongful imprisonment of a Jewish
army officer for “raisons d’Etat” produced ripple effects within other fields: military,
law and—with Zola’s newspaper declaration of “J’Accuse!”—the literary field. To-
gether, these schisms created a political crisis resonant with allegations of state betrayal
(Bourdieu 1996a, pp. 129–133; 2013, pp. 159–560; 2014, p. 308).
Following such a crisis, wider societal transformation may ultimately be repressed.
Such was the case in May '68, not least because of the students’ incapacity to engage
realistically with workers. But long-lasting field changes may still occur. In the context
of '68, Wacquant (1993, p. 11) rightly emphasizes the effect of the subsequent, more
conservative, field of power on the grandes écoles themselves, especially the pivotal
shift from the prestigious, academically-autonomous Ecole Normale Supérieure—a
product of the Third Republic—to the more heteronomous Ecole Normale
d’Administration, the power-base of the recently famous “énarques” (Bourdieu
1996b, pp. 197–214). This theory of a “recuperative,” “conservative” transformation
after 1968 (2015, pp. 482–483) is further elaborated in Bourdieu’s postscript to the
Rules of Art (1996a), his assessments of neoliberalism and bankers’ thought (e.g.,
1998b), his study of publishing (1999) and The Social Structures of the Economy
(2005).
It is significant that Bourdieu’s last great work, Pascalian Meditations (2000a),
decisively rejects the notion of amor fati (eternal acceptance of one’s social fate) (cf.
2015, pp. 373, 578). Bourdieu had always repudiated the Althusserian view that
educational state apparatuses created a supine subordinate class, rendered by the force
6 Bourdieu’s categorisation of time owes its phenomenological depth to Husserl’s conceptual schema.
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of ideology intomere bearers of social structures (see, for example, Bourdieu 1990a, p.
41; 1996, p. 53, Bourdieu and Hahn 1970). But, earlier, he had stressed accommodation
or “complicity.” He had also frequently contested a mechanistic Marxism that assumed
that occupancy of an objective class position is a necessary and sufficient condition for
actors to grasp an understanding of their industrial and political interests (1990a, chap.
3; Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992; Bourdieu 2019). In particular, he had referred on
numerous occasions to the allure of national political “mythologies,” competing with
class formation. Drawing not just on Marx but also on Durkheim, Weber, Elias, and
Cassirer, Bourdieu has sought to fill these gaps in theoretical understanding with a
“generalised materialism” (1990a, p. 17): one that includes analysis of symbolic power
and symbolic violence (2016, pp. 792–793, cf. Loyal 2017).
Indeed, following the 1990s’ retreat from post-war Keynesianism in the
metropolitan heartlands, Bourdieu’s empirical work registers a widespread sense
of anomie and social suffering. This is provoked not just by unemployment,
restricted opportunities, or even the devaluation of degrees, but by a broader
deficit in actors’ sense of their own social justification. Their lack of symbolic
recognition goes alongside underlying relational continuity, not least, of course,
the structural efficacy of elites in negotiating their own reproduction. Yet
against the mistaken conclusion that Bourdieu is unveiling iron laws of a
mechanical force rather than probabilities based on historical relationships
(1984, pp. 92–96), he clarifies that his research addresses also enduring mar-
gins of liberty (1990a, p. 50; 2000a, pp. 204, 234–235; 2015, p. 448). In
certain contexts, such margins for manoeuvre permit innovation, collective
resistance, and transformative processes, and not just within segregated fields
(2000a, p. 185; 2015, pp. 578–579). Stating explicitly that sociology and
history should be united, Bourdieu holds it essential to account both for
structuration7 and for innovation or change (Bourdieu 1995, pp. 108, 122;
2015, p. 574).
Bourdieu is unusually subtle, compared with other writers such as Clark (2015), in
showing how reproduction via privileged families is accomplished. Indeed, the demys-
tification of these mechanisms that favour the privileged - from “sanctuary schools” to
social connections—fuels a disenchanted “ethic of suspicion” (1996b, pp. 190, 216–
229, 360). However, it is too restrictive to read the portrayal of social reality in his opus
as solely subject to a determinist logic. He also offers an accompanying, internally
consistent theory of structural change, although, admittedly, his theory needs further
elucidation of the precise situations in which crises emerge and successful symbolic or
social revolutions are provoked. As he has argued, such crises may eventually termi-
nate certain patterns of enduring reproduction, whether what is at stake is the peasant
world-order, traditional forms of patriarchy, the post-war “trente glorieuses,” or the shift
from academic to modern painting.
This assessment of a neglected theory of historical change in Bourdieu’s works
needs to be further defended. I start with his wider view of state transformation, proceed
7 Structuration is conceived in terms of actors’ habitus incorporating the collective “historical unconscious
(Durkheim) of a class, which is united—via “conductorless orchestration” (Marx)—by the “mastery of a
common code” (Bourdieu 1990a, pp. 56 and 59).
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to his analysis of prophetic heresies and symbolic revolutions, and end with his mature
views on exploitation, suffering, and the denial of symbolic recognition.
On the State (2014, 1989–92 lectures)
In What Makes a Social Class, Bourdieu (1987a) had already analysed objective gulfs
in the possession of capitals, showing how, at certain junctures, those without any
capitals champion their socio-economic interests whilst at other times they turn to
solidarity based on religious or national allegiances. On the State (2014) further
illuminates the emergence in Europe of territorial loyalties tied to such a “national
habitus.” Indeed, whereas Leibniz had contended that the geometrical intersection of all
perspectives is the prerogative of divine vision, Bourdieu maintains, in Durkheimian
fashion, that, historically, this privileged geometrical space is that of the state:
The coup d’état from which the state was born […] attests to an extraordinary
symbolic act of force, which consists in getting universally accepted, within the
limits of [a] certain territorial jurisdiction […] the idea that all points of view are
not equally valid, that there is one point of view that is the measure of all points of
view, one that is dominant and legitimate. (2014, pp. 68-69, cf. Durkheim 1957,
pp. 79-80)
The state presents itself as the general will: in his pithy terms, the state is: “a site made
by agents commissioned to state the public good, to be the public good and to
appropriate public goods” (2014, p. 86).
The coup d’état from which the centralised modern state is born could only have
happened under specific historical circumstances: neither in a clan society where the
primitive accumulation of economic capital had not yet been launched nor in feudalism.
Indeed, he argues that the centralised state of the seventeenth century preserved the
monarch and his chain of interdependent aristocrats but at the cost of feudalism (2014,
p. 131). Crucially, he contends that state formation entails not just the monopoly of
physical violence but also that of legitimate symbolic violence (2014, pp. 125, 128,
346).
Bourdieu aims to illuminate this via a genetic structuralism or a “negative sociolo-
gy,” free from state-imposed ideas (2014, p. 108). The key transformation is the
establishment, within Louis XIV’s “king’s house,” of a new “game”: a logic of the
state based on a “law of the universal” (see Wacquant, ed., 2005). Hence sociology
must theorise a Hegelian state (a legitimate rule underpinned by the principle of
universalism) as well as a Marxist state (a regime performing functions for economic
capital) (see also 1998a, pp. 35–63). Specifically, “the state is a Janus about which it is
impossible to state a positive property without simultaneously stating a negative
property” (2014, p. 98): hence “the other side of universalization [of culture] was a
dispossession and a monopolization” (2014, p. 101, see also p. 99).
Consequently, certain forms of symbolic domination go alongside the creation of the
nation-state, such as the arbitrary devaluation of competing languages. With the unified
nation-state and unified language, linguistic codes such as Languedoc or—I might add,
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Glaswegian Scots—became subordinated to that of Parisian French (or Received
Pronunciation English) (2014, pp. 119–121, 351). The popular groups, thus
marginalised, developed their own “counter-language”: forms of “resistance” to the
dominant linguistic form (2014, p. 89; 2002, pp. 100–102).
The state reinforces a national habitus. Bourdieu is in accord with Gellner (1983)
and with Corrigan and Sayer (1985)) that national social solidarity is enhanced by
legitimating certain tastes and awards. These encompass not just popular rituals such as
the “Englishness” of drinking tea or beer, but also consecrated culture: French classical
theatre, the (British) National Gallery (2014, pp. 152–153), university degrees (2014,
pp. 98–99) and the bestowal of national honours or other “symbolic baubles” (Bourdieu
2000a, p. 239). Such collective beliefs extend to official collective memory, as in the
longest obituaries, the French Légion d’Honneur or the Panthéon, the mausoleum for
honoured citizens (2000a, p. 245).
Bourdieu cites both Marx and Weber to show that the state mystifies the concerns of
the dominant classes, discreetly concealing their wider class interests behind the
theatrical display of power (2014, p. 98). Yet from that very process the concept of
the general interest and universal rights is born. This is the invention of jurists (the
“State Nobility” or noblesse de robe), located within the expanded seventeenth and
eighteenth century legal and bureaucratic fields. From this invention flows the potential
for transformative change: “[J]urists are the driving force of the universal, of univer-
salization” (2014, p. 270), with their proclaimed independence and their “capital of
words” (2014, p. 331) […] “[t]hey were the bearers of a rational habitus […]” (2014, p.
333). And where legal opinion favours change, their coveted autonomy reinforced it:
The logic of these social worlds means that transhistorical things are generated such
as science, the law, the [idea of the] universal, that is, things that, though socially
produced, are not reducible to their social conditions of production. (2014, p. 96).
Bourdieu analyses such universal rights in conjunction with the State Nobility’s
prudent monopolisation of its own elite cultural position, not least by the most
“primitive” means, the transmission of offices via inheritance (1996b; 2014, pp. 308–
309). He acknowledges that the resulting exclusion of outsiders verges on the
“patrimonialisation” of the public. Nevertheless, the theoretical shift in these lectures
to the notion of the legal universal as a transhistorical achievement, born of struggle, is
incontrovertible. Heralded in Habitus, Code and Codification (1986; 1990b, pp. 80–
85), the lectures of 1989–92 (On the State) elaborate on the progressive or rational
goals for which jurists—nobles and commoners—have undergone sacrifices. It is my
contention that this mid-1980s’ universalistic perspective represents a critical revalua-
tion on his part, particularly in light of the contemporary extensions of instrumental
market reason, or utilitarianism (see Guibentif 2010).
Steven Loyal (2017, pp. 9–10) is right that On the State tends towards a Durkheim-
ian evolutionary model rather than a revolutionary Marxist model. The democratic
state, in Bourdieu’s view, possesses “fiduciary capital”—frontiers, diplomas. It can
even require that you lay down your life for it. But along with this analysis—not too far
from Durkheim on the state as social brain—Bourdieu consistently recognises the
Marxist truth that: “all these State games serve some people more than others, and
serve the dominant more than the dominated” (2014, p. 113; Durkheim 1957, p. 104).
It is in line with this double truth that Bourdieu censures Marx’s dismissal of
Parliamentary democracy in The 18th Brumaire as merely “analogous to theatre […]
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a shadow play that obscures the real struggles taking place elsewhere …” (2014, p.
355). On the contrary, democracy as a legal form has become a condition of the
dominated classes’ participation (2014, p. 359). Yet Bourdieu recognises, alongside
this, that the reality of the state is often entirely different from its idealised represen-
tation. At critical junctures, their Realpolitik overrides every moral frontier. He had
earlier cited the French deep state’s systematic use of torture in the Algerian War. In his
view, every French town ought to erect admonitory commemorative plaques recalling
the State violence of 31st Jan. 1961: the mass drowning of Algerian demonstrators in
Paris by police (2004b, pp. 66; 2014, p. 256).8
The last section of these extraordinary lectures deals with the “rebirth of individu-
alism”: the neoliberalism of the late 1970s on. This is nothing less than a state-directed
attack on the “cultural revolution” of the late nineteenth century in France, in other
words, the initial establishment of the Welfare State. This historical cultural revolution
with its “socialization of risk” and “logic of public interest” (2014, p. 363) was in large
part constructed by the social sciences, against philosophical individualism (2014, pp.
364–366).
The current assault on public protection entails the reduction of the “social state,”
even the creation of “civic deserts” in entire lower-class areas, from which hospitals,
state housing offices, and other dignified architecture has been removed (Bourdieu
et al. 1999, pp. 126–129). This is a highly dangerous policy, for the Welfare State not
only serves but controls. It “domesticat[ed] the dominateds” he observes, alluding to
what he terms Weber’s “Marxist” formulation of these issues (2014, pp. 358–359). For
Bourdieu, these changes or “secessions” culminated in a “non-state within the state”
(Bourdieu 2014, p. 359). They represent—as Loyal emphasizes—a recent strengthen-
ing of the Right Hand of the state against the Left Hand—in other words, the great State
Nobility against the minor State Nobility of teachers, social workers, magistrates in
lower courts, etc. (Bourdieu et al. 1999, pp. 203–205, 222–226; Loyal 2017, pp. 107–
108, 113–114; see also Swartz 1998, p. 237). Loyal and Swartz are right, but for
Bourdieu the decline of public projects such as social housing can only intensify inner
contradictions. Given the state’s evident failure to recognise—symbolically or
practically—the needs of the subordinate class, such state “secessions” provoke despair
and widespread volatility.
Bourdieu’s powerful account of the emergence of a universalistic view conceptual-
ises the bureaucracy or state legal officers (jurists) as the guardians of the “national
habitus.” Yet he simultaneously proffers a “materialis[t]” analysis of the field (2014, p.
342). The legal profession, for example, possesses a specific “interest in disinterested-
ness,” not least its own generational reproduction (2014, p. 342).9
This argument for the importance of law was first formulated by his friend, E. P.
Thompson (1975), and published in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales in 1976.
For Thompson, the genesis of the British agrarian bourgeoisie (or capitalist gentry) in
8 Jessop (2015) rightly comments that Bourdieu (2015) underestimates the Gramscian and Poulantzian
tradition; however, it is incorrect to say that he omits any analysis of the “deep state”.
9 According to Bourdieu, the appointment of jurists to a centralised monarchical state has three main
“contradictions,” of which this is the third. The first is the absolutist monarchy’s “pious hypocrisy” in claiming
the “public interest” when it appropriated the rights and property of the feudal nobility for its own private
interest; the second is the inconsistency of practices requiring that the new jurists be chosen for their talents
and industry alone whilst the king’s privileges and those of the aristocracy (noblesse d’épée) are inherited.
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the eighteenth century meant that, on the one hand, the law became a “superb
instrument by which these rulers were able to impose new definitions of property to
their even greater advantage, as in the […] furtherance of enclosure. On the other hand,
the law mediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed, again and
again, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers” (1975, p. 264). The law—notably the
Black Act of 1723—might be “iniquitous.” It was beyond the reach of many, but:
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize
nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony. The essential precondition for
the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an indepen-
dence from gross manipulation and shall seem just. It cannot seem to be so without
upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being
just. (1975, p. 263) (Thompson’s emphasis).
Nothing could distil more clearly what Bourdieu means by the State coming to
possess, through the law, a monopoly of symbolic power as well as force.
Bourdieu’s analysis of state transformation may have been rooted in his own
experience of growing up in the provincial southwest of France (the Béarn), which
gave him an unusual insight into the distinctive trajectory of French state centralisation
(2004b). In three articles published from 1962 to 1972 (collected in The Bachelors’ Ball
(2008c)), Bourdieu broaches the analysis later taken up inOn the State. In particular, he
addresses the decline of the peasant mode of production in the Béarn. Initiated by the
recession of the 1880s, deeply undermined by the post-World War I rise in prices in the
national market, and, more recently, by changes in the global market, the movement
from a “closed world to an infinite universe” engendered a peasant decline (2008c, p.
174). The Béarn’s long independence under its dukes—despite its incorporation within
France in the sixteenth century—had endowed a relatively egalitarian provincial world
orchestrated around a prosperous and secure peasant class. With its own strategies
based on social honour—especially the rule of marriage between peasant equals, with
dowry exchange as a prerequisite—the peasant holding was kept whole and relatively
prosperous until the late nineteenth century. But since the inauguration of a “critical
phase” with World War II, and despite innovations such as agricultural cooperatives,
the better-educated women from the hamlets had preferred working in small towns and
marrying urban employees (2008c, pp. 185–189). The new marriage preferences
hastened the spread of French (as opposed to the peasant patois) and the urban ethos,
“accumulating contradictions” or “cognitive costs” for peasant sons, now seen as
uneducated and ineducable (2008c, p. 55). Hence the remarkable number (56%),
post-World War II, of peasant men consigned to a bachelor existence—“reproduction
forbidden.”10 The national market leads to the devaluation of the once-autonomous
peasant class. Unable to “represent themselves,” they become a “class for others,” an
ignominious “class object,” subject to contempt alternating with Heideggerian
romanticisation (2008c, pp. 193–200, 1991b).
In the light of On the State, Bourdieu’s analysis of an enduring peripheral peasant
world after the collapse of seigneurial feudalism should be seen as possessing affinities
10 Bourdieu’s ethnography of gendered practices alludes to spinsterhood and the constraints of women’s lives
with resident mothers-in-law, but the systematic nature of patriarchal control then escaped him. Consequently,
he identifies peasant daughters marrying townsfolk as “Trojan horses”: the bearers of peasant destruction
(2008c, p. 178).
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with other accounts of French absolutism, notably Elias’s (2006) assessment of the
pacification of the feudal aristocracy at the French court and Brenner’s (1987) “prop-
erty relations” approach. In particular, Brenner shows how the success of French
peasant rebellions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries led to the subsequent
sixteenth century emergence of a “centralised political accumulator”: protection of
the peasantry from the depredations of the feudal nobility, the central extraction of a
surplus in the form of State taxes and the growth of a legal administrative class (1987,
pp. 289–291).11 Yet if, for Brenner, the French State’s political absolutism led to the
survival, after feudalism, of a peasant agriculture, for him peasant holdings—prone to
fragmentation—ultimately ensured only the development of “underdevelopment”
(1987, pp. 61–62). For Bourdieu, in contrast, the Béarn farmers resisted fragmentation
and continued a peasant “civilization” that, until World War II, could satisfy its sense of
honour and material needs.
One last point re On the State. Bourdieu argues that the Great French Revolution of
1789was enacted politically by radical lawyers rather than by industrialists stepping into
the political arena. In this respect he is certainly persuasive. He is also convincing that
revolutions are not always cataclysmic (as indeed Thompson had emphasized, in
relation to the English agrarian bourgeoisie (1975)). However, as with his earlier
accounts of power, he tends to focus too much on symbolic power, so that he sometimes
“leaves fundamental relations of force unexamined” (Wacquant 1987, p. 80). Thus, he is
less plausible in contending that the French Revolution should ultimately be seen as
unnecessary since the jurists and the monarchy had already undermined the old feudal
seigneurial class: “I published The State Nobility in 1989” he writes, “to show that the
French Revolution essentially did not change anything…” (2014, p. 346).
On the contrary, the crucial decision is whether the jurists’ “bourgeois revolutionary”
acts led to an independent centre of economic capital accumulation being set in motion
(Davidson 2012, p. 476, see also pp. 482–483). In France—and the French
Caribbean—such revolutionary events were the only means by which the remaining
feudal dues, rights to slaveholding and arbitrary taxation could be swept away, under
the banner of universal “Rights of Man.” These prerequisites for the capitalist coloni-
sation of everyday life required a revolutionary break to establish a new set of socio-
legal structures and the resulting genesis of a distinctive “economic habitus.”12 Here
Neil Davidson is surely worth following when he says:
For Marxists, capitalists exist as “capital personified”, their actions constituting a
“mere function of capital”. […] Whether the culture of their life world expressed
aristocratic or bourgeois values is less important than their integration into […]
capital accumulation, which imposes its own, deeper cultural logic. (2012, p. 372).
11 In sharp contrast, the sixteenth century nobility in England undertook a class “political accumulator”
strategy, which also entailed agrarian surplus-extraction via capitalist tenant-farming, heralding the end of the
independent peasantry (Brenner 1987, p. 293).
12 Bourdieu defined “economic attitude” or—subsequently—“economic habitus” as the rational calculation of
the means to achieve future wealth, notably the pursuit of profit for its own sake (see 2008a, especially pp. 68–
69 [1959] and pp. 76–81[1963]).
0 Note, however, that Durkheim proposed a highly progressive normative model of the modern state: a central
democratic forum for deliberation on policies and laws, flanked by democratic secondary associations,
amongst which were producer associations resembling modern cooperatives (1957, pp. 62–63; 85–97).
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On this specific issue, then, Bourdieu’s analysis of the rise of the State and the role of
symbolic power in national integration moves too closely within the orbit of
Durkheim’s evolutionary republicanism.13 Yet despite such reservations about his
interpretation of the French Revolution, he has made important contributions to the
study of social transformation, notably, in On the State, the rise of a legal profession
trained in universalistic practices, the establishment of democracy and the origins of the
welfare state. Indeed, far from being a theorist of reproduction alone, he has made
significant contributions to the historical sociology of social transformation in general
and our understanding of France in particular, especially 1848 and 1968 (see 2014, also
1988, 1996a). “Had he wanted,” wrote Eric Hobsbawm in his obituary: “he could have
been a great historian himself” (Hobsbawm 2016, p. 39).
Manet: Une révolution symbolique (2013)
Those who lament the absence of transformation in Bourdieu’s works often neglect his
theory of symbolic revolution in the arts and sciences. Whilst apparently less conse-
quential than political or economic revolutions, for Bourdieu, artists and scientists are
nevertheless dangerous because they have the potential to play havoc with the everyday
visions and divisions of the social world. They may thus break through the mythology
which he believes is so important in helping to secure power (2016, pp. 771–772):
[A] symbolic revolution turns cognitive structures upside down and sometimes,
to a degree, social structures. (2013, p. 13).
Bourdieu’s final lectures (1999–2000) (Bourdieu 2013), elaborate in greater detail one
such historical moment when a gaping rupture appears within social institutions (cf.
Bourdieu 1993, pp. 238–266). In his view, Manet’s creation of an artistic field—with its
comparatively unregulated (or “anomic”) institutions—introduced a new “margin for
manoeuvre,” as did the recently-established modernist literary field constructed by
Baudelaire, Flaubert, and Mallarmé (2013, p. 138). Contrary to the Russian formalists’
model, these cultural producers did not exercise complete autonomy. Nevertheless, the
bohemian space became the equivalent of scientific laboratories for testing new
practices (2013, p. 71). Its emancipatory potential profoundly affected everyday life,
removing one of the legitimating pillars of political power. Within this field, Manet is
important as the “heresiarch” (2013, pp. 647–678) who adopts a new kind of painterly
manufacture emerging from his revolutionary “technical habitus” and from his Left
Republican “ethical habitus” (2013, pp. 82–83).
This portrayal of Manet shows his pioneering “prophetic” role in undertaking an
artistic revolution against the French Academy of Fine Art. For what Bourdieu calls his
“reflexive provocation towards reflexivity” (2013, p. 64) was more complex and
13 Note, however, that Durkheim proposed a highly progressive normative model of the modern state: a
central democratic forum for deliberation on policies and laws, flanked by democratic secondary associations,
amongst which were producer associations resembling modern cooperatives (1957, pp. 62–63; 85–97).
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intertextual than the largely naturalistic style of the later impressionists. To analyse this
rupture, Bourdieu transfers Weber’s theory of charismatic prophets to the art world.
Thus, he details how the routinized works produced by the painters trained at the Ecole
des Beaux Arts precipitated Manet’s extraordinary acts of estrangement and transgres-
sion. In this visual revolution the banalized “Academic eye” is challenged by a socially-
constructed “fresh eye”: “fresh” because Manet profoundly subverts the sacrosanct
Academic hierarchy that had given primacy to Biblical and historical genres. His new
painting abandons Academic conventions such as compositional unity or the narrative
rule of “making a pyramid” (2013, p. 63); indeed, he is vilified as “mad” for flouting
both the Renaissance rule of perspective and the imperative of meticulous “finish,” the
essence of conservative “pompier” painting (Bourdieu 2016, p. 569).
This new study brilliantly situates Manet’s revolutionary subversion by depicting the
entire Academic system as a “total institution” (2013, p. 181; cf. Goffman 1961).
Seeing Academic painting as equivalent to a state art, not unlike that adopted in 1934
by East European state socialist societies (2013, p. 179), Bourdieu outlines the struc-
tures underpinning its orthodox mode of educating, commissioning and exhibiting
artists. He emphasizes the sacrosanct Academic hierarchy of artistic subjects. Thus,
in large secular works like Déjeuner sur l’Herbe (1863), Manet parodied Giorgione
(1477–1510), shockingly depicting a “grisette” (a working—or working-class—wom-
an) sitting, nude, with two elegantly-dressed upper-class men. Tantamount to a
proclaimed infraction of Academic decorum and techniques, this painting, like Olym-
pia, was deeply discomforting to the “apparatchiks” of the scholastic professorial elite,
who saw themselves as the guardians of legitimate art (2013, p. 243). Indeed, as a
“specific revolutionary” (2013, p. 25), Manet subverted the Beaux Arts’ monopoly of
symbolic goods. He even risked imprisonment or exile, by portraying the “burning
issues” of the day, such as the exile of the Paris Communard, Henri Rochfort, or the
execution of the Mexican Emperor, Maximilian (2013, pp. 18, 39).
In defamiliarizing the art-historical doxa by these means, Bourdieu follows
Mallarmé, who claimed that Manet acted as a scientist, disclosing hidden social reality:
Manet “paints the naked truth with a new eye, without presuppositions, unburdened of
Academic painters” (Mallarmé, cited 2013, p. 306). Crucially, Manet’s art made a
double revolution: an artistic revolution in form and a political revolution by a Left
Republican against both the state and the French haute bourgeoisie:
This strategy of collision of all the hierarchies is a strategy of a double blow, a
blow at once against the Academy and the bourgeoisie.” (2013, p. 39).
Note that, for the mature Bourdieu: “the imputation of realism is not exclusive of the
imputation of formalism” (2013, p. 61).
Bourdieu’s lectures on Manet are subtly different from his initial accounts of the
genesis of modernism. He now adds to his earlier “internalist” analysis of the prophetic
revolution in form and genres (1993 [1987], pp. 249–250, 264–266), a much fuller
materialist or “externalist” analysis of the social relations leading to the changes in the
artistic field. Indeed, making another Durkheimian move, he goes even further: a
socioanalysis should abolish the “sacred frontier” between the two approaches,
externalist and internalist (2013, p. 149).
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In materialist (externalist) terms, Bourdieu had always referred to the super-profits to
be made on the market, after the two French 1848 Revolutions (1996a, pp. 48–49). He
had also recalled the heightened tensions in the Academy as more and more painters
with the bac demanded access to Academic teaching and exhibition space: students
from newly-returned aristocratic families as well as from the haute bourgeoisie. Indeed,
as he elucidates in other lectures, these objective changes in education represent a crisis
in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts overlooked by all other writers on the history of modern-
ism (2016, pp. 574, 584–586). But Bourdieu’s externalist analysis now acknowledges
and benefits from the path-breaking work of Marxist writers, such as Meyer Shapiro
and Tim Clark, the feminist critic, Linda Nochlin, and the social historian, Robert
Herbert, all of whom chart the transformations of French capitalism beyond the old
artisan-based workshops. In doing so, he addresses the altered modes of production and
consumption that are “refracted” (cf. Adorno) in Manet’s works. He shows forcefully in
these lectures how Paris—with its expanding labour-force of factory-workers, women
shop-workers, clerks, and performers—was transformed into the Haussmanised urban
metropolis that became the artistic capital of the world.
Bourdieu also explains much more fully now why it was Manet who should
have been the prophetic innovator ushering in this “total crisis” (2013, p. 161).
Crucially, Edouard was not “at home in the world,” despite coming from a
high-ranking family, his father being a judge, and his mother the hostess of a
salon attended by bankers and politicians. His bac, money, patronage, and
bodily demeanour all testified to his class privilege, yet he moved uncomfort-
ably between the elites’ dignified houses and the impoverished attics or cafés of
Bohemian painters. In a memorable use of a late concept, Manet is stated to
possess a profound “habitus clivé” (split or fragmented habitus): he was caught
artistically between rebellion and the desire for Salon recognition (2013, pp.
84–85, 250), the corollary of his passage between the two social worlds (2013,
pp. 454–455, 458–459). It is this same fragmented habitus that underlay his
iconoclastic vision. For his innovative ways of perceiving and dividing the
world represented an outsider’s prophetic or revolutionary stance, despite his
excellent insider’s mastery of art history. Bourdieu reflects:
What is it about those people who whilst totally ‘in’ [in English] are also
totally ‘out’ [in English]? It’s this, a symbolic revolutionary: it’s someone who,
completely possessed by a system, comes to take possession of it by returning
the mastery he possesses against the system. It’s very strange. In the advanced
forms of autonomous universes, the fields, it’s the only form of revolution.
(Bourdieu 2013, pp. 377–378).
Bourdieu shows in his Manet lectures an exemplary analysis of an artistic revolution
or social change. This combines first, an internalist explanation in terms of the heretical
abandonment of orthodox dispositions in his artistic practice (2013, pp. 82–83);
second, a materialist or externalist analysis, including the explosive pressures to which
the Academy educational structures were subjected, and, third, an explanation at the
level of Manet’s distinctive personal trajectory. Fabiani is right that other painters, such
as Courbet, also made important innovations within the Academic system (2016, p.
178). Yet Bourdieu is convincing that Manet, with his split habitus, was the chief
“prophetic” architect of this revolutionary break.
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This distinctive modernist subfield of art was established with new rules and
a new anomie. Subsequently, fresh avant-gardes surfaced every generation,
anxious to be recognised as genuine artists and solidaristic in defending their
distinctive shock of the new. Thus, by the twentieth century, the modernist field
is characterised by a forcefield of “permanent revolution,” in which consecra-
tion occurs with increasing rapidity, bringing commercialisation in its wake
(1993, p. 188; 1996a, p. 169; 2015, p. 670). Nevertheless, the work of Manet
has an epistemological primacy: the symbolic revolution he made was crucial to
the genesis of the modern artistic field itself.
The intelligentsia as a universalistic corporation
Bourdieu has always stressed the pivotal role of doxa, combining, in this respect, Marx
and Husserl. For him, social injustice is frequently “misrecognised” and treated as
natural (doxic), part of the social order that goes without saying. Rather than empha-
sizing solely how ideologymystifies and distorts economic interests, he draws attention
to the sources of this natural attitude and the social conditions under which it might be
challenged. When do heresies (“heterodoxies”) become the new common sense?
Here—as we saw with his analysis of Manet’s prophetic charisma—Bourdieu develops
from Weber a deeper, more relational theory of charismatic power as a source of social
dynamism. Crucially, he breaks with the Weberian view that the prophet acquires
charismatic power by force of personality or by simply responding to a need for
leadership (“supply and demand”). Instead, for Bourdieu, prophetic leaders’ critique
of the priesthood derives in part from their own lived experience of powerlessness and
denigration, especially at the hands of the higher clergy (cf. Berger 1963). There is,
moreover, a crucial homology between the prophets’ bitter denunciation of the priests’
worldliness within the religious field and their critique of the wider field of class power.
Marginalised and oppressed themselves, prophets offer new messages of hope to other
“left-behind” social groups.
Wider social conditions provoke the masses’ turn to prophets, breaking with their
usual realistic adjustment. For it is crises—scarcity, war, hyper-inflation, mass migra-
tion, or colonisation—that are conducive to symbolic—or cultural—revolutions
(1990a, p. 59; 1991a, p. 34). In turn, these cultural revolutions, such as Calvinism,
may help to engender wider social transformations (such as the British seventeenth-
century Civil War). They alter the power dynamics among prophets, elites, and masses.
Interestingly, before quoting the famous opening of The 18th Brumaire (Marx 1973
[1852], pp. 146–149), he argues:
If there is, doubtless, no symbolic revolution which does not presuppose a
political revolution, the political revolution is insufficient by itself to produce
the symbolic revolution which is necessary to give it [the political transformation]
an adequate language, the condition for its full accomplishment […]. For as long
as a crisis is without its prophet, the schema by which one thinks the upside-down
world are still the products of the world to be reversed. (Bourdieu 1991a [1971],
p. 37, trans. Amended; see also 2015, p. 579).
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Crucially, Bourdieu contends that, at times of national or international crisis, the
prophetic movement may engender a sense of the working class as a “mystical
body”—a group unity that is created through “an immense historical labour of theo-
retical and practical invention” (1985, p. 742, cf. 2019, pp. 116–117). He clarifies
further, in his Sociologie Générale lectures, that this is an anti-charismatic conception
of social creativity. Paradoxically, “groups create themselves by creating people who
create the group” (2019, p. 118).
Like Weber, Bourdieu extends the concept of charisma beyond the religious field. It
was often the oral poet who was a charismatic leader or prophetic bearer of new ideas in
precapitalist societies (1990a, p. 94; 2016, p. 604; 2019, p. 81). Such bards typically
frame a double-coded message: on one level, accessible ideas for the people, on another
level, more complex ideas for the educated or leisurely (2008a, pp. 286, 291, 299, 305;
2019, pp. 21, 81). The lectures enhance this phenomenology of crisis and change:
The sentiment that things tend to persist in their being, that there are careers,
probable futures […], this all totters in the periods of crisis. […] It’s favourable
terrain for prophetic intervention. From the moment […] when one doesn’t see
too much what is going to happen, the prophet intervenes. It’s the poet in
precapitalist societies. In societies like ours, a politician comes to the fore. It’s
not at all an ordinary politician, it’s Cohn-Bendit [the student leader of
May 1968], it’s someone who speaks when everyone else is mute. …” (2016,
p. 139; cf. 2000a, p. 236).
These ruptures in the normal habitus provoke deliberation or despair (2016, pp. 911–
912, 974); yet they also release untapped resources and dispositions, thus creating new
social possibilities (2016, pp. 905, 957–958):
[I]t’s on the basis of their dispossession of […] capital at a given moment of time
that the dominated can be led to try to transform the structure under certain
conditions […], when the usual agreement between objectivated and incorporated
structures has been suspended.” (2015, p. 579).
In fact, the ideology of creation is not entirely mistaken, for the prophet “tell[s] the
people what they know already, but do not know how to tell themselves. It’s a real
conversion…” (2016, p. 1073).
Weber had already identified a third group (beyond priests and prophets) in his
analysis of change: the precarized or “proletarianized” intelligentsia. Bourdieu adds that
wherever there is a struggle over the symbolic, secular intellectuals are crucial for
producing weapons that are “[...] coherent and distinctive” (1987b, p. 134) deriving
from their professional associations that champion universalist human rights (1989).
But—once again—such intellectuals also possess their own symbolic and material
interests. Even as intellectuals assert their own disinterestedness, they possess “interests
in disinterestedness” (1990b, pp. 110–111; 2000b, p. 106). Further, whilst breaking
with Michels’ pessimistic elite theory, Bourdieu warns us that intellectuals bring with
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them the dangers of political substitution for the class they represent, especially where
educational levels are low (1991c, pp. 174–175, 277 fn. 2; 2019, p. 117). Nevertheless,
as Loyal has also emphasized (2017, p.113), he demarcates the “subversive alliances”
that can bring social change:
It thus may happen that the interests associated with the dominated position in
the field of cultural production lead to subversive alliances, capable of threaten-
ing the social order. This occurs when, in the cognitive struggles over the social
world, the professional producers of principles of vision and division, globally
located in the dominated positions in the field of power [...], engage their cultural
capital in struggles that they more or less completely [...] identify with their own
struggles in the field of power.” (Bourdieu 1996b, p. 387).
Bourdieu continues:
“when, in other words, certain cultural producers (defrocked priests of the
millen[arian] movements of the Middle Ages, revolutionary intellectuals, etc.)
symbolically abandon the camp of the dominants from whom they derive their
power of symbolic construction in order to lend to the dominated their power to
constitute the social order [...].” (1996b, p. 387, my italics).
Bourdieu refers here to the subaltern members within the dominated fraction of the
dominant class—social workers, teachers, unpromoted academics, etc.—all those un-
dergoing a “double domination” (Bourdieu, p. 2014, p. 326; see also Swartz 1998, p.
237, and Swartz 2013, pp. 240–244). Such groups—including artists—may galvanise
others in their claims for social justice (Bourdieu 2000b, pp. 97, 106; Bourdieu and
Haacke 1995).14
In the late 1990s, Bourdieu defended political action by intellectuals on the basis of
specific expertise. There is no incompatibility, he remarks, between the separation
entailed in autonomous membership of a social scientific field and collaboration or
engagement within wider social movements (2000b, pp. 89–107). Given the imminent
destruction of a “social world that has been extraordinarily difficult to establish” at the
hands of a neoliberalism that “masks brute economic force,” there is a need once again
to establish “utopias founded on truth and reason” (2000b, p. 105; also 1998b).
Is the mature Bourdieu surreptitiously reinstating Sartre’s “consciousness-raising”
(1990a, p. 45)? I think not, partly because he always emphasized the incorporation of
domination, requiring austere learning to retrain our whole being—body and mind—to
instil fresh customs and habits (2000, pp. 12, 108; 2001, p. 40). Moreover—unlike
Sartre—he emphasizes the collective social supports for “authentic intellectuals,”
including the collegial germination of ideas (1990a; 2008b). He critiques the latter’s
extravagant claims to universal knowledge, insisting on the “specific intellectual,” with
14 Swartz (1998) is right, however, when he says that Bourdieu glosses over when this is more likely to
happen—why some fields rather than others have subordinate actors who ally themselves with workers in a
“politics of collective mobilisation” (1998, p. 136).
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bounded expertise, not Sartre’s fantasy of the “total intellectual” (1980, p. 12). He was
always mindful, too, of the demographic and other non-normative conditions that
produced crises, as in the expanded nineteenth-century student population that tolled
the doom of Academic art education (cf. 1990a, p. 45).
Exploitation and margins of freedom
Bourdieu’s last significant theoretical formulations—Pascalian Meditations—can be
linked to these earlier lectures. In particular, the two volumes of lectures in Sociologie
Générale are stirring because they emphasise vividly sociology’s role in bringing about
reflexivity, thus ending what William Blake called our “mind-forged manacles.”
Reflexive awareness is difficult—and never absolute—because we are determined
more than most people would like to believe:
If sociology teaches, if it publicizes itself, but equally if many fight against it and
watch that it is as little diffused as possible, it is also because it aims to diffuse a
privilege [...] [A]s sociology gives a knowledge of determinisms and thus a
possibility of liberty in relation to determinisms, to write sociologically, or to tell
everybody about it […] is to work to diffuse, to universalize, the possibility of a
liberty. (2015, p. 455, see also p. 448).
He continues: “I am going to go to the end of the prophetic logic […] My project, in
effect, is to give […] a manner of thinking that people can put into practice, including
against what I say...” (2015, p. 455; cf. Bourdieu 2000b, p. 104).
Earlier, in 1970, he had clarified this relationship between social science and action:
“The sociologist only helps in raising awareness: afterwards people act” (Bourdieu and
Hahn 1970, p. 20, see also pp. 14–15 and 21).
This concept of practical action opposes both final causation (teleology) and
a mechanistic materialism (cf. 1990a, ch. 3). Like Walter Benjamin, he was
critical of those economistic accounts that had turned Marxism from social
science into a predetermined logic of necessary historical stages. Like Marx,
he alerts us to the powerful consequences of a theory gripping the minds of the
masses or “theory effects” (Bourdieu 2019, pp. 69, 77, 81)). Yet he still
identifies with the tradition of an authentic historical materialism as though
this were a rich hidden vein of gold (1990b, p. 13). In major works and
throughout his lectures, he emphasizes that his theory of practice, with its
element of improvisational liberty, embodies the active aspect of humans’ being
within the world (1990a, pp. 21, 57).
What then does this “margin of liberty” or capacity to “improvise” mean for him?
First, those actors who lack all capitals are often subject to “misrecognizing” power. Yet
such actors are also more prone to adopt an alternative vision, the belief that “another
world is possible.” Misrecognised forms of power may sometimes induce resignation
or even complicity, but they also engender social suffering: indeed, suffering more
often than happiness (Bourdieu et al. 1999; Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992, pp. 111–112).
Further, whilst there are deep affinities structuring the preference of specific groups for
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specific ideas, there continue to be significant “margins of liberty” as to how such
suffering is expressed (2016, p. 1074). Indeed, one of the elements that characterises
Bourdieu’s distinctive approach is his insistence that the habitus—determined by
objective position in relation to the possession of capitals—is endowed with a “relative
autonomy” as to how symbolic power impinges on it and thus shapes practices:
the move into politics occurs when we leave the doxa […] and move to an
orthodox or heterodox experience […] It is in this […] that there is room for
manoeuvre.” (2019, p. 72).
Second, in societies where cultural fields still possess functional autonomy, scientific or
other peers have a margin for manoeuvre. They can decide for themselves which
research projects to support, disregarding other types of determinism, such as class,
religion, or ethnicity (2016, pp. 594–595). A scientist is not fully at liberty: she or he is
determined by the social rules of scientific method (2004a, p. 52), but is free to use her
scientific capital and habitus to critique—say—the consequence of state policies.
Thirdly, and more generally, those actors who possess extraordinary cultural capital
in any particular field will also possess the potential to restructure that field and to
revalue its values. We have seen this in the case of Manet’s symbolic revolution, but it
applies elsewhere—to Newton or to Baudelaire for example.
It should finally be noted that the late Pascalian Meditations has been somewhat
overlooked as an analysis of objective contradictions, particularly of class and race. For
example, drawing on Capital Vol. III, Bourdieu clarifies here that average profit rates
are maximized when labour is at its most mobile, when the labour process has been
most deskilled and when the artisanal work-ethic of the labourer counts for little
(2000a, p. 202). He endorses Marx’s view that the pathos of capitalist labour lies in
the fact that the exploitative extraction of surplus value typically remains concealed
(2000a, pp. 202–203). Indeed, in Sociologie Générale II, he states that the theory of
surplus value counts as one of the great “foundations” of social science; yet laments
that Marx fails to integrate into it a scientific analysis of the resistances to diffusing it
(2016, pp. 105–106; 2019, p. 66). Ultimately, a deep affinity exists between the
position of the dominated and social science:
[O]nce scientific truth is produced, those in the space who are dominated hear it
more clearly, and immediately make use of it, reworking and recycling it so that it
expresses them more fully. (2019, p. 44; cf. 2019, p. 73).
It is true that he strikingly engages the Jansenist, Pascal, to explain the somatically-
embedded “customs of the heart” that lead actors to resilience in the face of
(misrecognised) injustice. But he also elucidates further the phenomenology of alien-
ation when symbolic recognition or honour is withheld: most notably, those injuries of
social class and race that provoke discrimination and unemployment. Thus, those
devoid of work discover that unemployment becomes “dead time”:
Deprived of [work] they can only experience the free time that is left to them as
dead time, purposeless and meaningless. If time seems to be annihilated, this is
because employment is the support, if not the source, of most interests,
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expectations, demands, hopes and investments in the present, and also in the
future or the past that it implies, in short, one of the major foundations of illusio in
the sense of involvement in the game of life…. (2000a, p. 222; cf. also 2008, p.
204).
The symbolic violence of racism leads to severance of the usual predictable connec-
tions between present and future. It is this, for example, that compels African-American
parents to make their children fear authority: here he draws poignantly on James
Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time (1963)—as true now as at the time of writing:
‘Long before the black child perceives this difference […] he has begun to react to it,
to be controlled by it. Every effort made by the child’s elders to prepare him for a fate
from which they cannot protect him causes him secretly, in terror, to begin to wait,
without knowing that he is doing so, his mysterious and inexorable punishment. He
must be “good” not only to please his parents [but because] behind their authority
stands another—nameless and impersonal, infinitely harder to please, and bottomlessly
cruel.’ (Baldwin cited 1993, p.170).
In Bourdieu’s view, such objective sources of suffering become unbearable when
there is structural change between anticipated practices and the new social reality
within a given social position, resulting in hysteresis (1996, p. 186)15 or a “maladjusted
habitus.” Produced by massive socio-economic changes or “social ageing,” this habitus
creates a sense of “contre-temps”: of living in a different time, including a potential
awareness of countervailing forces (2015, p. 381).16 In other words, pace Fabiani’s
(2016, pp. 83–86) critique of Bourdieu’s “oversocialised” conception of habitus, the
subordinate classes for Bourdieu may tend in general towards resignation in response
to their pain but not to certain specific changes, with the resulting mismatches of
habitus.
This does not imply that workers will necessarily take industrial action or act
politically. Bourdieu’s earliest work, on colonial Algeria, should remind us that the
most precarious—like those now in the gig economy on temporary or zero-hours
contracts—are so preoccupied with the struggle against destitution that they are often
too desperate to act in organised opposition (Bourdieu 2008a, pp. 75–111, 153–191,
213–235). Indeed, in 1999, he describes this declining power of unionised labour as
itself “the end of a world” (Bourdieu et al. 1999, pp. 317–320). Yet, in some cases,
temporary workers can mobilise effectively despite such obstacles, as shown in Jain’s
Bourdieusian study of the Suzuki car factory at Manesar (India) (2016). For where
significant structural “rationalisation” has occurred (as in Manesar with the changed
line speed, reduced holidays, and greater sanctions), this may be sufficient to induce a
15 He emphasizes particularly the “misfirings” of habitus when, for example, students with degrees do not get
the jobs they anticipated: a mismatch that applies particularly to educated African-Americans in the United
States. Others have explored further the consequences of this. Thus Lamont (2000) for example, has
conducted a powerful empirical study into discrepancies in the readiness to perceive inequality as injustice
as between African-American workers and white American workers (working- and middle class), and as
between those in America as contrasted with France; she elicits fruitfully not just workers’ moral views but
their carefully-constructed philosophies.
16 As Bourdieu remarks on numerous occasions, this is “the Don Quixote effect,” referring to Sancho Panza’s
naïve expectation of feudal paternalism (quoted 2015, p. 549 n. 2; cf. also 1990a, p. 62; 1990b; p. 90) On such
a Don Quixote effect, see also Marx’s letter to Lassalle and Marx’s article in the New York Daily Tribune, 11
Jan 1858, both cited in Prawer (1976, pp. 215, 240).
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sense of crisis. Workers then come to re-evaluate heterodox beliefs, in the latter case,
adopting a “fuzzy logic” combining revolutionary theory with Hinduism (2016, p.
223).
Conclusion
Bourdieu’s work has been misjudged as a determinist theory of pitiless social repro-
duction alone. This accusation—especially common in the Anglophone sphere—may
be linked to the rhythm of his translations. As Gorski suggests, Bourdieu first became
known for works that focus on the long-lasting reproduction of dominant families
(Gorski 2013, p. 3).17 This simplistic interpretation of his thought has been accentuated
due to his misattribution to “postmodernism,” along with anti-Enlightenment theorists
like Baudrillard or the later Lyotard (cf. Calhoun 1995, pp. 132–135).
I hope to have shown that Bourdieu possesses a complementary analysis to repro-
duction, namely a compelling theory of crises and “prophet”-led symbolic revolutions,
sometimes within one field, sometimes harmonised or synchronised across fields; this
is, moreover, integrated with a materialist account of interests. Particularly where the
dominants in the wider field of power are fractured, such crises tend to suspend doxa
and promote transformative change (as in the case of the wars which preceded the
Russian 1917 Revolution and the Portuguese 1974 “Carnation Revolution”). Bourdieu
sees material position—including the absence of all capitals—as necessary but not
sufficient to provoke interests in a movement for wider societal change across eco-
nomic and political fields. Rather a heterodox prophetic figure (or figures) must emerge
who offers an imaginative new vision and division of the world. This alone can
galvanise men and women into undertaking the long labour of forging a united
group—as in the historical labour movement—sometimes against powerful alternative
nationalist currents (1985; 1987; and 2019, pp. 116–117).
Allying himself with historians like Charle, Chartier, and Darnton, Bourdieu’s
account of societal transformation is internally consistent, but never fully realised in
detail: an initial architectural drawing, as it were, rather than a fully-specified, three-
dimensional architectural model. However, sadly, it remains a common charge that
Bourdieu’s theory of practice is severely marred by its alleged ultra-determinism. Yet
which positivist determinist would write:
We seek to lift the lid which bears down on the heads of the poorest. Just as
medicine has liberated us from infantile mortality [...] so our education ought to avoid
the mutilation that the current social system inflicts from generation to generation on
the underprivileged. (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, p. 11) (my italics).
Further, which unremitting determinist would stress a countervailing potential? Yet
the first pricks of the habitus—for example, urging those with capitals ceaselessly to
enrich and pass down their privileges – can be countered by learnt reflexivity (Bourdieu
17 The Algerians (1962), then Reproduction (1977), The Inheritors (1979) Algeria 60 (1979), Outline of a
Theory of Practice (1977), and Distinction (1984). Yet it is notable that, even in these works, reproduction is
accompanied by other social transformations. Distinction famously differentiates between the “punitive
discipline” up to the 1960s and the later soft discipline—the “velvet glove” of consumer seduction and
associated market sanctions—whilst The State Nobility documents concurrently the changing hierarchical
position of the various grandes écoles.
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and Wacquant 1992, pp. 136–137; 2012). And which fatalistic determinist would
elaborate on the margin for freedom and resistance as Bourdieu did, saying: “All
progress in the knowledge of necessity is progress in possible liberty” (Bourdieu and
Chartier 2010, p. 39)? Finally, which proponent of an unassailable iron law of
reproduction would defend a “reasoned utopia,”18 accept an Ernst Bloch Prize, and
lament that utopianism now [is] so often “discredited, dismissed and ridiculed in the
name of economic realism” (Bourdieu 1998b, p. 125; 2000, p. 103; Bourdieu and
Chartier 2010, p. 17)?
I would argue that Bourdieu’s entire works exemplify with unusual originality and
synthesizing power, Gramsci’s “Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will”. As he
remarked, in Gramscian vein:
[T]he ethnosociologist is a sort of organic intellectual of humanity who, inasmuch
as he is a collective agent, can contribute to denaturalising and defatalising human
existence by putting his competence in the service of a universalism rooted in the
understanding of particularisms. (Gramsci 2008a, p. 355).
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